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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S'r_.\TE OF l7rrAH 
Plaintiff a-nd Respondr:·J~t, 
JESSE hi. GARCIA, JR .. , 
Defendoot and Appellant. 
Caso 
No~ 9092 
APPELLANT'S PETITION 
FOR RE~HEARING 
rrhe Appellant, Jesse ~1. Garcia, Jr., respectfully 
request~ the Court to set at-5ide its decision heretofore 
rendered on September 8, 1960~ and to grant a re-hearing 
in the above entitled matter for the reason that ~a ill de-
rision is not in accordanc.c with the l.a ,.r in that: 
PoiNT I. 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES~ AMEND. XIV~ 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ART. I, 
§ 12 IN THAT HE WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL 
BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JURY IN THAT THE 
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TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY COMMUNICATED 
WITH A JUROR. 
Por:"'TT II .. 
THE APPELLl\NT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES} MiEND~ XIV, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ART. I, 
§ 12 IN THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
BE PRESENT AT ALL STAGES IN THE PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
Tile ~.:\.ppellant Gare.ia submits here\vith a brief mem-
?randum in 8npport of the foregoing petition. 
Dated Oetober 31, 1960. 
1-f.L~::\REX AND MILLER 
By. L. L-- -------- ~ L ••• L------- . -- ~.--L ---------. ' -L.-- • ----- ---- ' • 
Gorald lt ~filler 
n 
....... 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF r~T.L\H 
PI a·iJt.t-~:.tr and Respo·n-den f ~ 
-vs.~ 
JESSE l\f. GARCIA, JR .. , 
Defendam..t a·nd .ilppPlla·nt. 
Case 
No. 9092 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGl~T\fEXT 
PorNT I. 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU .. 
TION OF THE UNITED STATES~ AMEND~ XIV~ 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ART. I~ 
~ 12 IN THAT HE WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL 
BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JURY IN THAT THE 
TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY COMMUNICATED 
\VITH A JUROR. 
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In the Court ~s opinion in the instant case v-.'hic-h was 
filed on September 8, 1960, appellant 's argument, as stat-
ed in Point I above~ 'vas discussed. The Court decided 
that there 'vas nothing about the situation which "'Ould 
tend to prejudice the defendant, and that in fact it was 
·quite proper~ The Court's reasoning on this joint is in 
error. T·he communication which took plaec between the 
judge and a member of the jury was clearly improper. 
The trial judge should have refused to 1 • ear the question 
of the juror, cx.e.ept in open court vr'"ith the defendant and 
his counsel present 
The statutes of this state are clear on this 5nbject. 
They make no exception in the (·ase of the t.rial judge. See 
Utah Code Ann~§~ 77 ~31-27, 7"7-Jl-28 (1953 )~ The statutes 
prohibit any communieation betwec11 a member of a jury 
and a third person. The good int.entions of the trial judge 
cannot. correct the error. 
The a ppella r1t had no duty or burden to shovr preju-
dice. The incident itself is eno11glL As this Court said in 
/;;tate v. ·Thorn.P., 96 Utah 208, 117 Pae~ 58 (1911): 
~' .... To gay that the ac-cused cannot sustain hi~ 
claim of prejudiee until he also shov,rs that the 
juror talked about something harmful to the ac-
eused ~s ri~ht s is to fritter away the constitutional 
and statutory provisions requiring the jury to be 
kept secluded from all outside influCTlces~ ~' 
It is enough that the inc~idcnt ,\-as oontrary to the proper 
conduct of a trial judge. 
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The decisions of othel' jurisdictions support the posi-
tion that sucll a communication iR reversible error.. In 
Berness r. State, 38 Ala. App .. 1, 83 So. 2d 60"7, Aff'd 83 
So. 2d 613 (1953}, the defendant appealed from a con-
viction of murder in the ~econd degree. The appellate 
court reversed, and in so doing stated as follows : 
''An incident oc.curred hov\""ever during the 
course of this tr[al v.rl1ich, in our opinion, necessi-
tates a reversal of this cause, Vt·hich incident "\vas 
fully brought to the court ~s attention by a motion 
for a new trial and hearing thereon. 
''After the hearing and arguments had been 
completed, but be fore the court had instructed the 
jury, the court declared a noon recess. The jury 
were permitted to separate, but cautioned by the 
court not to discuss the case either among them-
selves or with anyone else. 
'"As appellant's attorney was returning to the 
court house after lunch, accompanied by another 
attorney, they observed on a corner near the court 
house several of the jurors in conversation v-.Titl1 
one of the State's main witnesses~ There ,,·as al~o 
in the group I\.ir. T.Juthcr Tays, a distant relative 
of the deceased girl 
"As the two attorneys passed the group one of 
them remarked' There goes Berness' la,vyer .. ' The 
two attorneys passed on down tlH_~ street, and after 
diseussing for a few minutes what they had seen, 
they proc-eeded to the chamlJers of the trial judge. 
Judge Ilill was then in the Register's Office~ which 
adjoins his private office, reading deeisions in 
preparation for his oral c.hargc.. ..\s to \vhat oe-
curred from this point ,\~e quote the following ex-
cerpt from Judge Hill'~ statement read into the 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reeord on the hearing on the motion for a new 
trial~ 
• At approximately 12:45 lJ .. m. someone 
knocked on the door and I opened it and fou11d 
that ~\f r~ Eugene Burts, Attorney for the de-
fendant, Rernet-;R, together "Titll a friend of 
his~ a lawyer, lfr ~ Emmett Roden, \van ted to 
see me. They stated that they had 8CCn one 
of the State's witnesses, to \vit: J\.1 r. Grady P. 
Yanccyt talking to one or more jurors on the 
southea8t corner of lhe iT1tcr.sect.ion of Court 
and Tennessee Streets~ wllicll point \Vas vis-
ible from the offiee in whicll T was working 
and in 'vhich the three of us were then stand-
ing. They directed my attention through the 
v-.rindow to the group" and I saw some men 
standing and talking, t.hougl1 T eould not make 
out VI-Tho it '\\Tas.. I then stated to T\[ r~ Burts 
t.hat I was very sorry this circumstanee had 
arisen, that I had instrut.1ed and relnstructed 
the jury not to talk to anyone about the e.ase, 
ete., hut that I would go down there imme-
diately and see \\:-hat they were talking about 
and tell them that they should not talk to any 
'vitness in the case about a 11 y subject - or 
vlords to that effect. I do not rcnu~ rn ljet~ 
11Jhether the Attorney for the de.f'e·rula·nf made 
a-ny reply to thi~ s11-g.qestion on tny part, or 
a-nH stalenu<n f whatsoevf'r co n<·crui u g it 
1 1 vlent to the corner )n question a11d ~a"\v 
two or three jurors "\vho~e names I do not 
rernent1H:r, ln1t. "\rr~ (}rndy P. \-aneey \Va~ not 
f lu~re at that time~ l tl1 en told these jurors 
that it had been reportrd to m() that a \\-it-
ness for the State had been t.aJking to tlH.~m on 
that eorner a l' r \V moment~ before. I told 
them, in substance, that. \\'e had to be Yer~-· ~ 
vety careful a hout th(l actions of jurors dur-
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ing recesses in cases in court, and that tlu"'y 
should not engage in con versa tiou \\-i th n 1• y 
person \Vho had been a \vitness in a en~c or 
1vho had n11yt hi ng to do 'vith the ca8e,. or \~'ho 
might have n ny interest in the case one \\'a y or 
the other, and that they should nol let any 
sue.h person converse v"'ith them. I further 
stated that it \Vould be better for them not to 
talk to anyl)ody in tbe ease, or any such per-
son \Vho m[ght have uny interest in the case 
about any suhjeet~ not about the 'Wt~n her or 
any sueh innocent. su hj e(·t. rrhcse th rcc men 
assured me at that time that no one lJad talked 
to them about anything concerning the caRe 
at triaL 
'I then left that corner, croAscd the street, 
went into the second .store from the cornert 
which ,.vas l!ilner "s Drug Store .. and there 
found ~r T'. Grady P .. }..-.:nu"L"'~T .. I told \f r.1.:r uneey 
that it had been reported to me that he had 
heen seen talking to one or more of the jurors~ 
~fr. Yancey quiekly told me that he had not 
meant any harm and was sorry that he had 
talked to any of the men at all on the street 
corner, but that he had merely to1d one man 
that some man named Williams, "~ho had been 
absent from this County approximatPl)' fifty 
yr~ar~ \va~ hack in the C~oun(r and v..'anted to 
~=H l(l some kinsman of one of the jurors, or 
vlord~ to that effect. I told ::\Ir. Yaneey that 
it would be better for him not talk to any juror 
about any subject- the weather or othervtise+ 
I then ate my lunch in 1 rih1er~s Drug Store 
and returned later to the Courtroom+' 
'' 1~ ndonbtedly the spontaneous actions of the 
very able trial judge were moti\~ated by l1i~ earnest 
desire to see that tbis CHHe "-a.s co11dneted accord-
ing to all the rule~ of trial proeed u re, the o h~ t~ r\·-
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ance of which he had studiously enforced so long 
as tho participants were under his direct and 
orderly QOntroL Regardless it would seem tllat 
th c 11et result of his actions upon being informed 
that the jurors had disobeyed his injunctions creat-
ed a situation aptly described by Robert Burns 
when l1 e observed that : 
~ rrhe best laid schemes 0' mice an :P men 
Gang aft a-gley, 
... ~n ~ lea 've us nought but grief an, pain.' 
''In t\\-'0 recent cases1 one by the Supreme 
Court, and one by tllis court, See X eal v. State~ 
257 Ala. 496, 59 So. 2d 797; Chancy v. State, 36 
~4.1H. A.pp. 37 4, 06 So. 2d 385, it \\:as held to be re-
versible error for the judge, even though accom~ 
panied by dcf ense coUJtsel, solicitor t and court re-
porter, to go into the jury room and further in-
struet the jury in the a l,sence of the defendant. 
"This for the reason that it has been a long rec-
ogn i Z(_!d tenet 0 f' tl1 e (~0Inlll00 1 U"\Y, based bot 11 up011 
the interest of the accused as 'vcll as t11e interest of 
the public, that the continuous presence of the 
accused from arraignment to sentence is an essen-
tial part of the proeess of trial and \\ithout 1vhic.ll 
tlle courts have- no jurisdiction to pronounee judg-
ment upon him.. Conformity to this rule i~ jur-
isdictional. 
'~ Tn tile discharge of his off-icial d-uties th.e 
j urlfJf 's place is upon the bench+ E ~~en t h. ere, h.e 
can harc: no comm-un.itntion 1rith the jury except 
in. opt?.n court, a·nd~ in· felrnries, i·n tlu~ p-rc .. ~c-n(.'e of 
the acC1.1..scd and his: ro un~el if reaso-nably o rail able. 
''In the present case the co·nJ.·u~ u·nica-fion be· 
t~ct::cn f.he judge and juror.~· tvas in. the street 1 and 
in the absenre of both eounsel und acc11sed. Fun-
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damental tonstitutional rights of the accused were 
thus infringed~ negating the court ,s jurisdiction 
to render judgment. Under s1.lch circ·uJnstances 
there cwn properly be no application of the doctrine 
of error 1Eithout 1-n,iu.ry." (Emphasis supplied) 
Certainly the facts of the instant case fall1rvell within 
thr- scope o~· Be-rness. A conversation in tllc street, during 
a noon rece.sH, and before the jury \\:as inHt.ructed, seems 
far less hat·mful than the incident in the ins I ant case. 
However, as the court iu the Berness case correctly held, 
the communication itself was error regardless of harm 
or laek of harm to the defendant. 'There can be no ques-
tion but \vhat. the trial judge meant V{ell in the instant 
ease. In Berness the trial judge had equally good inten-
tions. In fact, he was n..c ting in a manner ""T hich he he 1 iev ed 
\\-ould a void error in the proceedings. His intentions "T~A'ere 
immaterial to the question before the court. The 1\Ja bama 
court held that the trial judge eould properly act only in 
open court \vith the defcndall t and his counsel prcsc11 L 
The faet that tl1c def(_lnse eounscl i11 Berness neglected to 
rai~e U1l) .. objection to the aetlon the judge propoAed 
did not mitigate the error. X or was it necessary for the 
defendant to change his position, or introduce Hdditional 
evidence~ There "tvas nothing about the situation pre-
sentetl in the Beruess case in regard~ to the communica-
tion bet \\·ccn the judge .and t.he jurors which would tend 
to prejudie.e the defendant expressly. That i~, not.l1ing in 
the conYersatiOil as report~J by the trial judge in any 
,,~uy injured or harmed the defendant In this regard 
Bernesti is ~imilar to the instant case. T}1is is not the test~ 
however. rrhe test merely inquires as. to 1vhethcr or not 
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an improper communic-ation occurred~ The only proper 
communication bet,veen the judge anrl jury is in open 
court in the presence of the defendant and his counsel 
Tho X cw 1vlexieo court in ~)tate v. Bcal, 48 N.},{, 84, 
146 P. 2d 175 ( 1944), reversed a conviction of murder be. 
cansc t.hc trial judge after jury had retirerl to deliberate~ 
and vrithout the knowledge or consent of the defendant or 
his c.ounsul, sent to the jury room certai11 exhibits 'vhich 
had been entered by the state. In doing so they cited 
State v. Hunt, 26 ~--:. "\f. 1.60, 189 Pae. 1111 {1920), "?i~hlch 
comes very elose to the facts i11 the instant case .. 
In State v .. Il'l.t.-ul, the co\~rt. announced a recess; as the 
jury were leaving the jury box and before the judge 
left the bench, a juror approached the judge and stated 
that the jury ~Ta.s curious al1out a certain shoe which 
had been introduced in evidence. The jury desired to have 
the shoe in question opened so that the interior thereof 
might be discovered in order to determine whether or not 
the toe of the shoe c.ontained blood. There V{Cre several 
bystanders within hearing distanee of the juror at the time 
he addressed the judge. The ~T ew :Jlrxico court t.hen stat~ 
ed as follo"'~s: 
'' ~ L L the judge of the eourt thereupon stated to 
said juror that~ if the jury desired that this be 
doll e, the proper c'Oll rse to f ollo,,~ ''!as for one of 
the jury to rise before tllr· court in the ju1·~~ box in 
open court and make such request; 1 hat at the 
time said request \\"a~ so made hy said juror ... in 
Tcponse ( ~ie} to srt id req u (\~ t the de~ f c.~nd ant~ 'vere 
not~ nor \Vas either of them~ and counsel for de-
10 
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fendants were not, nor was either of them, within 
hearing so far as the court is aware of said juror 
4 • • or of the said court, or of the said colloquy 
'vhich occurred between the said juror .. ~ and the 
eourt .. ,' 
Later in the trial it appears that the juror fo11o,ved the 
judtrc 's advice and made his request from the jury hox 
in open court. rrhe court in H1rnt held the communica-
tion betw·een the judge and the juror to be improper. 
It \viii be noted that the only thing the trial judge 
did in the lln;nt case \\·as to advise the juror tlntt l~iH C(Ht-
duct was improper and to indicate the proper procedure 
to folio YilT in asking his question. 'Vha t possible harm 
could this do the defendants in that case f There is a sug-
gestion that the counsel for the state became R\vare of 
the communication~ and sine.e the juror did not make his 
request in open court until after arguments had bec11 
made it seems reasonable that the state \-3 attorney used 
this information to his advantage .. The appellant Garcia 
in the instant case argued this same point in his brief 
on appeal, claiming tl•at counsel'~ kno\vledgc of the jury's 
thinking unfairly affected the subsequent course of the 
triaL 8ee Brief of Appellant, page 22. 
The court in the H-N·nt ease ruled on the haf.;i~ that 
there \vas an improper cum.munication4 It did not inquire 
into the actual harm v,rhich mHy or may not have inured to 
the defendants4 This is the proper rule of la\v. The Court 
in the instant c~ a f-a: has committed error, .and a re~ hearing 
should be granted. 
11 
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PoiNT II. 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES~ AMEND. XIVJ 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ART4 I, 
~ 12 IN THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
BE PRESENT AT ALL STAGES IN THE PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
It is a fundamental principle of the law of crimi-
nal procedure t.hat tho deferalant in a felony case has the 
right to be present at all Atages in the proceedings. This 
is ar1 absolute right., and there can be no valid trial or 
judgment un 1 css he l1as been H fforded that right. The 
Co11rt is in error in l1olding that the comrnuTlication 'Yhich 
t.ook place in the instant case betv{een judge and juror was 
not properly considered part of the proceedings. Any-
thing 'v hich affects the rights of the def cnda nt from tl1 e 
time tl1e jury is impaneled unt.i l a verdict is reached is 
properly considered part of the proceedings. This r()m-
munication certainly affected the rigl1ts of the defendant 
in that it 'vcn t to the merits and the la \\~ of the ease~ 
This position has been upheld in many jurisdirtions. 
In lflidgett Y~ State, 216 ~ld~ 26, 139 ~~- 2d 209, the !\Iary-
land Court of .l~.ppeals stated that t11c accused in a crim-
inal prof.lecution has a constitutional guarantee tl1at he 
must be present at every stage of his trial from the time 
t1u: jury is impanel{ld until it rc;~ehes a verdict., and this 
includes the right of the accused to be present '"Juln tlu.:r~· 
is any communiC<ttion \vhatsoever betv{een t.he court and 
the jury. See also CroUt ... e v~ f.!"u·itcd F·/f(1fts, 200 F. 2d 
12 
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526; lV hite v. State, 149 Tex. Crim R-pts. 419, 195 S.W. 
2d 141. 
T u Bernr..ss v. State, 38 .Ala. App. (~L 1, 83 So .. 2d 613, 
the Supreme Court of Alabama stated as follows: 
"\\T c cannot agree with the validity of the 
State's a.rgumcnt to the effect that as the court had 
declared a short recess~ the ~~trial~~ was not then 
in progress so a.s to require the presence of the 
defendant at the time additional admonitions and 
instructions 'vere given to some members of the 
jury by the presiding judge.'' 
"'It is ner.cssary tor the orderl:r-· administration 
of jn~ticc that the trial (~ourt have disciplinary 
power over the jurorst the p;l rtics, and offieers of 
the court, continuously from the beginning of the 
trial to the final return of the \'(~rdict.. rrhe manner 
in \vhich t.hc trial court cxercisr~ this discipline, 
is a matter of supreme iut.ere~t to the defendantr 
Unle~s he voluntarily abi-lt~nt s himself, he and his 
counselt if reasonably available, have a right to 
be present at every exchange bet\veen the judge 
and jury, where the conversation is germane to any 
important incident of the trial. n 
Trt Berness the communication took plar.e ·i1t the 
street outside of the court house during the noon recess. 
1"" et the court held this to be part of the proceedings. See 
Page 8. 
These cases stre~R the point that nothing affecting 
the rights of the defendant can properly be done in his 
absenee. The coromunlcRtion bct\vecn tbe judge and juror 
took place during the triaL It went to the la"\~~ and mel" I h~ 
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of th~ -caso4 The defendant had an absolute right to be 
present at that conversation. That right ~ras de11icd him. 
To hold that such a communication v.ras not properly 
considered part of the proceedings is clearly erroneous. 
t~rhe Court has committed error in this regard and a 
re-heari11g should be granted .. 
COXCLL"SION 
The _;\ ppcllant Garcia respectfully urges t.hat. the 
Court 'viii find its decision rendered in this case to be 
untenable and therefore grant a re-hearing .. 
Respectfully submitted, 
II.t\XSEX AND !\liLLER 
Cou·nsel for Appellant 
410 F1mpire Building 
Salt T.Jakc City, Utah 
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